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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
WILMITH J. REES, 
Plaintiff and Appellant, 
vs. 
MURRAY CITY BOARD OF ED-
UCATION, a corporate body, and 
WENDELL C. DAY, EARL Civil No. 8586 
HEALY, DAVID B. McCLEERY, 
PAULS. ROSE, LAWRENCE P. 
PARRY, J. EASTON PARRATT 
and VARIAN MORTENSON, 
Defendants and Respondents. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENTS 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Appel1ant in her brief states in a little over 
three pages how this case arose. She then goes on 
under four different sub-headings for an addition-
al five pages with an argumentative statement of 
the case. As this is an appeal from a summary judg-
ment, the factual issues should be reviewed in light 
of the principles applicable to such judgments. As 
Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure was 
taken practically verbatim from the Federal Rules 
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of Civil Procedure, a recent statement of the Court 
of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit might be taken 
as a guide. In that case, Killpack v. National Old 
Line Insurance Company, 229 F2d 851, ( CA 10, 
1956) the Court said: 
"Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 28 U.S.C.A., authorized the entry 
of a summary judgment when it affirmative-
ly appears from the pleadings, admissions 
affidavits, depositions and exhibits on fil~ 
that there is no genuine issue as to any ma-
terial fact. Since this procedure was not de-
signed as a substitute for the regular trial 
of cases, however, it should be invoked with 
due caution and all substantial doubts con-
cerning the existence of a disputed material 
issue of fact should be resolved against the 
moving party after a careful scrutiny of the 
record. 
"A review of the pleadings and support-
ing affidavits and exhibits in this case re-
veals the existence of several conflicts. A de-
tailed discussion of the points of difference 
is not necessary, however, since in our opi-
nion none involves an issue upon which the 
outcome of this litigation depends. The de-
cision is here controlled by unchallenged 
documentary evidence." 
That same Court a few years earlier in Brodr 
crick Trood P1·oducts Co. Y. C'nited States, 195 F2d 
.!;~:3, (CA 10, 1952), said: 
"But if it affirmatively appears from 
the. ple~din~s, admissions or d~positions 8:nd 
affidavits, If any, that there Is no genuine 
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issue as to any material fact upon which the 
outcome of the 1i tiga tion depends, the case 
is appropriate for disposition by summary 
judgment and the court should enter such 
judgment." 
As pointed out by Professor Moore in his Fed-
eral Practice, 2nd Ed., § 56.04, et seq., allegations 
in pleadings may be pierced by affidavits, deposi-
tions and other documentary evidence and sum-
mary judgment entered for the defendent. Profes-
sor Moore analogizes a summary judgment to a mo-
tion for a directed verdict, not to a demurrer as 
Appellant suggests. It is submitted that application 
of these princi pies is dispositive of the issues here. 
It is quite true that there are some conflicts in the 
respective affidavits but these conflicts are not ma-
terial to the basic issues upon which the decision 
of the trial court was based. It is submitted these 
conflicts involve window-dressing items entwined 
around the essential undisputed facts in such a 
fashion as to provoke sympathies for a poor school 
teacher as against a hard-hearted school board. 
What are these undisputed material facts? 
( 1) Beginning with the school year 1949-
1950, Appellant was employed by the defendant 
Board of Education for a term of one year as a 
teacher in the Murray City High School. (R 6) 
(2) Similar one year contracts were entered 
into between the Board and Appellant for the school 
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years 1950-1951, 1951-1952, 1952-1953 and 1953-
1954. (R 7-10) 
(3) Under date of March 29, 1954, the Mur-
ray Board of Education notified Appellant that 
it was not planning to enter into a contract with her 
£o:i: the school year 1954-1955. (R 39) 
( 4) On May 17, 1954, in response to request 
by her for a statement as to its reasons for not 
entering in to a new con tract, the Board advised her: 
"The Board, at its regular meeting on 
May 13, 1954, directed me to notify you that 
its action concerning renewing your contract 
was taken because the Board felt that your 
outside interests and activities and your gen-
eral attitude were unduly interfering with 
your duties as a teacher at the Murray High 
School". (R 41) 
In this same letter the Board offered to hold 
a special meeting on May 25, 1954, to hear her, but 
was advised by her counsel that he would not permit 
her to appear and the meeting was, therefore, can-
celed. ( R 63) 
( 5) No further action has been taken by the 
Board in connection with the matter. On July 8, 
1954, Appellant filed this action against the Board, 
the individual men1bers thereof, the high school 
principal under whom she served and the Superin-
tendent of the Murray City Schools, claiming on her 
first cause of action a breach of contract and on her 
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second cause of action, interference with contrac-
tua] relations. (R 1-5) 
Based on the pleadings, affidavits, documentary 
exhibits and the depositions on file, the Court grant-
ed the motion for summary judgment as to all of 
the defendants on the first cause of action and as to 
the Board of Education and its individual members 
on the second cause of action (R 70-73), leaving 
to be tried only the claim of interference with con-
tractual relations as against the principal and the 
superintendent of schools. This appeal is from that 
Order. 
Such other facts as are relevant to the material 
issues will be discussed in dealing with the issues 
raised in Appellant's brief. 
STATEMENT OF POIN:TS 
I. THE MURRAY CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION 
DID NOT BREACH ANY CONTRACT WITH MRS. 
REES. 
A. Appellant was not discharged. 
B. Appellant had no contractual right to re-em-
ployment. 
C. The Murray Board of Education had no power 
to make an indefinite employment contract. 
D. Any contract of the nature contended for by 
Appellant extending beyond the school term was illusory 
for want of mutuality of obligation. 
E. No such contract as contended by Appellant 
existed. 
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II. APPELLANT HAS NO RIGHT TO A HEAR-
ING. 
III. THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN DIS-
MISSING THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AS TO 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND ITS INDIVIDUAL 
MEMBERS. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE MURRAY CITY BOARD OF EDUCATION 
DID NOT BREACH ANY CONTRACT WITH MRS. 
REES. 
A. Appellant was not discharged. 
Appellant below and in her brief here has taken 
the position that she was discharged or dismissed. 
Such is not the case. All the defendant Board of 
Education did was to decide not to renew her one 
year con tract and so notified her. She served out 
her time to the end of the school year and the Board 
has paid her the full salary therefor as prescribed 
by the written contract. The only contract between 
the parties has been fully performed by both. It is 
well settled that a failure to rehire or renew a 
teacher's contract does not constitute a discharge or 
dismissal. Jllarion v. Board of Education, 97 Cal. 
606, 32 P 643 ( 1893) ; State v. Tr anarriaker, 281 P 
2d 846, (Wash., 1955); People c.t~ rel. Fursman v. 
Chicago, 278 Ill. 318, 116 NE 158, LRA 1917 E. 
1069; 47 Am. Jur. 387, Schools, §125. 
It is equally well established that no Board of 
Education can be forced to enter into a contract 1 
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with a teacher against the will of the majority of 
the Board. State v. Wanamaker, supra. The leading 
case on the power of a local school authority to de-
termine for itself whether it will enter into or re-
new a contract of employment with a teacher is 
People ex rel. Fursman v. Chicago, supra. In that 
case an attack was made upon a rule of the Chicago 
Board of Education adopted by it just before the 
commencement of the school year 1915 to the effect 
that the Board would hire no teacher who was a 
member of a trade union or a federation or associ-
ation of trade unions. The court upheld the validity 
of the rule stating: 
" ... A new contract must be made each 
year with such teachers as it desires to retain 
in its employ. No person has a right to de-
mand that he or she shall be employed as a 
teacher. The Board has the absolute right to 
decline to employ or to re-employ ·any appli-
cant for any reason whatever or for no reason 
at all. The Board is responsible for its action 
only to the people of the city, from whom, 
through the mayor, the members have re-
ceived their appointments. It is no infringe-
ment upon the constitutional rights of anyone 
for the board to decline to employ him as a 
teacher in the schools, and it is immaterial 
whether the reason for the refusal to employ 
him is because the applicant is married or 
unmarried, is of fair complexion or dark, is 
or is not a member of a trades union, or 
whether no reason is given for such refusal. 
The board is not bound to give any reason 
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for its action. It is free to contract with 
whomsoever it chooses. Neither the Constitu-
tion nor the statute places any restriction upon 
this right of the board to contract, and no one 
has any grievance which the courts will re-
cognize simply because the board of education 
refuses to con tract with him or her. Ques-
tions of policy are solely for the determin-
ation of the board, and when they have once 
been determined by it the courts will not in-
quire into their propriety." (emphasis sup-
plied) 
In an earlier case on the same point, the Ohio 
court in Frederick v. Ow~ns ( 1915) 35 Ohio C. C. 
538, appeal denied, 116 NE 1085 stated: 
" ... Neither the superintendent nor any 
of his assistants nor any of the teachers have 
any vested right in the positions that they 
hold. The right to longer occupy those posi-
tions terminates at the end of the period for 
which the appointment has been made, and 
thereafter the right to continue therein de-
pends upon the judgment of the superinten-
dent and the board in so far as assistants and 
teachers are concerned, and of the board alone 
in so far as the superintendent is concerned. 
It was necessary that this power of selection 
- appointment and reappointment - should 
be vested somewhere and the legislature saw 
fit to vest it in the superintendent and in the 
board of education ... " 
'The same issue came before the Washington i 
court a few years later and that court reached the 
same result, following and citing the Illinois and 
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Ohio cases and upholding a resolution of the Seattle 
School Board not to hire or rehire any teachers who 
were members of the American Federation of Teach-
ers, Seattle High School Chapter No. 200 of the 
American Federation of Teachers v. Sharples, 159 
Wash. 424, 293 P. 994, 72 ALR 1215. The Court 
said: 
" ... The employment of teachers is a 
matter of treaty or voluntary contract. Both 
parties must consent and be mutually satis-
fied and agreed. On the part of each it is a 
matter of choice and discretion. However, 
though qualified, no teacher has the legal 
right to teach in the schools until the direc-
tors willingly enter into a contract for that 
purpose ... " 
A Board of Education, having made its deci-
sion of policy not to rehire a teacher, a court cannot 
review such determination, People ex rel. Fursman 
v. Chicago, supra; Gibson v. Mabry, 145 Ala. 112, 
40 So. 297. As was said by the Ohio court in Fred-
erick v. Owens, supra. 
"The question here is, there being no 
showing that any teacher appointed is com-
petent to perform the duties of the position, 
can the superintendent and the board of edu-
cation be held to have abused their discretion 
in making selections, because they selected 
the ones they did instead of others who might 
have been chosen? It being true that neither 
the superintendent nor the board is required 
by law to state the reasons to anyone for the 
selections made, can the court enumerate cer-
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tain reasons as insufficient and then com-
mand the superintendent and the board of 
education not to omit to appoint for those 
stated reasons, and then punish them for con-
tempt if they do so? ... It is difficult to con-
ceive of anything that would be more certain-
ly productive of confusion in practical appli-
cation than the proposition that the courts 
may state to public officers the various 
grounds upon which they shall not determine 
against appointing an applicant for a posi-
tion under the control of such officers. This 
doctrine extended to its logical result neces-
sarily takes from the public officer very much 
of the authority given him by law to make 
the selectionsin question, and to that extent, 
and without the slightest warrant of law, 
passes this power over to the courts. We are 
very clearly of opinion that nothing exists 
in the statutes giving the courts any such 
power. We think it would be quite as justifi-
able for the courts to undertake to regulate 
all political appointments in the state by pre-
scribing that different political affiliation 
should not furnish sufficient ground for deny-
ing appointments, and then proceed to punish 
the public officer who violated the order by 
denying appointments on political grounds.;) 
'The members of the board of education are 
elected by the people. If the people make mis-
takes in their selection of men to fill these 
important positions, the ballot box, and not 
the courts, is the place to correct these er-
rors." 
This court has already recognized the prin· 
ciple that in the absence of some provision in the 
10 
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contract of employment or some statutory restric-
tion, an employer may discharge an employee at 
any time or for any cause without liability. Karna 
Held v. American Linen Supply Company, ______ Utah 
______ , ______ P 2d ______ , decided February 8, 1957. This 
court in Backman v. Bateman, 1 Utah 2d 153, 263 
P 2d 561, has applied this same principle to boards 
of education. Both the concurring opinion of Chief 
Justice Wolfe and the dissenting opinion of Justice 
McDonough in that case recognize that absent any 
legislative interdiction, a board of education might 
in its discretion refuse to employ or retain in em-
ployment any application or teacher for whatever 
reason its judgment might dictate. This court has 
also pointed out that a citizen outraged by a deter-
mination of policy by a board of education has no 
remedy in court, but has two alternatives: 
"One is by petition to the board and the 
other is by election of new members." Beard 
v. Board of Education, 81 Utah 51, 16 P 2d 
900 at 912; Allen v. Board of Education, 120 
Utah 556, 236 P 2d 756. 
B. Appellant had no contractual right to re-em-
ployment. 
'To attempt to escape the inescapable conclusion 
that it does not constitute a breach of contract to 
fail to renew a contract, Appellant argues that there 
was an implied "tenure clause" in her contract of 
employment. Just what this tenure clause was sup-
11 
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posed to be is not clear. In the portion of her brief 
arguing that she had shown a "prima facie case" 
for tenure, (Appellant's brief, pp. 12-18) it is in-
dicated that the tenure she claims is that "there 
could be no unilateral discharge without a thorough 
investigation and hearing before the Board." (Ap-
pellant's brief, p. 14) The quotation from Appel-
lant's deposition of Dr. Clove, the former Superin- · 
tendent of Murray Schools, appearing on page 15 
of her brief, indicates the same thing. Appellant's 
counsel, in questioning Dr. Clove as to what kind 
of tenure he had referred to put the same inter-
pretation in his question: 
''Q: In other words, before a teacher 
could be discharged, she would have to be dis-
charged through some orderly dismissal pro-
cedure?" (Deposition of Dr. Clove, p. 15, 
line 15) 
Inasmuch as Appellant was not discharged, the 
implied tenure clause thus derived by Appellant and 
her counsel, would not be applicable to her case even 
if it existed. ~ 
Since Appellant appears to be confused as to 
the 1neaning of "tenure", it might be helpful to re-
vil)YI briefly the tenure principle in the education 
:~it)lc1. Tenure generally takes one of two forms: (a) 
.. \ p:·o:~.c~·iption against dis1nissal of a teacher, i.e., 
L~1at her en1ploy1nent be terminated before the end 
of the con tract tern1, except for certain prescribed 
12 
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grounds and after a hearing, and (b) The establish-
ment of a right to be retained in employment in-
definitely, subject only to removal for certain en-
umerated causes and in a prescribed manner. See 
47 Am. Jur., Schools, § 127 et seq. Both of these 
types are norma1ly created by statute. No statute 
creating either type of tenure is in effect in Utah, 
and, as this court pointed out in Backman v. Bate-
man, supra, without such legislation mandate, a 
Board of Education in its discretion may refuse to 
hire or renew a contract for whatever reason its 
judgment might dictate. 
It is submitted that under the undisputed facts 
of this case, there neither existed nor could exist 
any contractual limitation on the discretion of the 
Murray Board of Education. 
C. The Murray Board of Education had no power 
to make an indefinite employment contract. 
'The Board of Education, being a creature of 
the legislature, has only such powers as are express-
ly conferred upon it and such implied powers as are 
necessary to execute and carry into effect its ex-
press powers. Allen v. Board of Education, 120 
Utah 556, 236 P 2d 756; Hansen v. Board· of Edu-
cation, 101 Utah 15, 116 P 2d 936. There is nothing 
expressly in the statute stating the Board's powers, 
(53-6-20, U.C.A. 1953) with respect to the employ-
ment of teachers. Since the Board has the obligation 
13 
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to maintain the schools, it would have implied auth-
ority to make necessary contracts for employment 
of teachers. There is nothing in that obligation, 
however, which would make it necessary that those 
con tracts extend beyond the school term. 
The only legislative provision with respect to 
the duration of a teacher's contract was not adopted 
by the Utah Legislature until the special session of 
December, 1953. That provision, (now 53-4-14, 
U.C.A., 1953), provides: 
"Boards of education of local school dis-
tricts may enter into written contracts for the 
employment of personnel for terms not to 
exceed five years, provided that nothing in 
the terms of such contracts shall restrict the 
power of such local boards to terminate such 
contracts for cause at any time." 
It is submitted that until that provision was 
adopted, the Board of Education had no authority 
to make a contract for more than the year to year 
basis practiced in M w·ray School District and in 
other school districts of the state, let alone the life-
time and good behavior contract contended for by 
plaintiff. 
The history of the 1953 Act amply demonstrates 
that it was intended as a grant of new power to the 
Boards of Education - not a limitation on existing 
implied powers of t11e Board. 
The bill had its genesis in the report of the 
14 
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sixty-man Utah Public School Survey Commission 
issued in February, 1953. On page 87 of that report 
the commission recommended as follows: 
"14. Necessary legislation should be 
enacted to permit the local boards of educa-
tion to adopt a po1icy of 'continuing contracts' 
extending beyond a single year." (emphasis 
supplied) 
At page 272 of that report appears a model bill 
drafted by the Commission to carry out its recom-
mendations. That bill was approved and recom-
mended to the Legislature by the Utah Legislative 
Council as originally drafted. The Governor, in his 
call of the Special Session, listed as among the items 
to be covered at such Special Session the following: 
"11. Legis1ation to permit employment 
of school personnel upon a five-year tenure 
by contract and to provide certain standard 
terms for such contracts, placing certain limi-
tations and restrictions on the boards and 
contracting personnel." 
The Governor, in his message to the Legisla-
ture at the opening of the Special Session stated, 
among other things : 
"I recommend the adoption of legislation 
to permit school boards to enter into five-year 
contracts with employees, subject to termina-
tion for cause at any time ... " 
The Governor went on to suggest certain re-
strictions on activities of teachers, primarily di-
15 
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rected toward curtailing their political activities. 
(Message of Governor J. Bracken Lee, First Special 
Session of the 30th Legislature, December 1, 1953, 
p. xv of the Session Laws of 1953). 
The bill, as originally drafted by the School 
Su1·vey Comr.aission and recommended by the Legis-
lative Council was adopted by the Legislature with-
out change and bore this .title: 
"AN ACT PROVIDING THAT BOARDS OF 
EDUCATION OF LOCAL SCHOOL DISTRICTS 
MAY ENTER INTO \YRITTEN CONTRACTS ; 
FOR THE EMPLOYMENT OF PERSONNEL 
FOR TERMS OF XOT MORE THAN FIVE 
YEARS ON COXDITION THAT SUCH CON-
TRACTS SHALL NOT RESTRICT THE POWER 
OF LOCAL BOARDS TO TERMINATE SUCH 
COXTRACTS FOR CAVSE AT AXY TIME." 
It is significant that in discussing this pro-
posed legislation, everyone concerned used the word 
"permit". If the intent were to limit existing power 
the verb used would have been "restrict" or one 
\\·ith silnilar meaning. ''Permit'' clearly indicates 
a grant of new authority, not a limitation on exist-
ing po\Vl'r. It is also significant that the Sixty Man 
Comn1ission used the adjecth·e "necessary'' to de-
scribe th<' proposed legislation. Certainly if school 
board~ already had the power to n1ake continuing 
con tracts existing beyond a single school term, such 
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legislation would not be characterized as necessary." 
Clearly after this Act was passed, the Murray 
School Board could not have entered into a lifetime 
or good behavior contract of employment with Ap-
pellant as she apparently contends. Its power is 
specifically limited to five years by the 1953 Act. 
Yet, if a special grant of authority was "necessary" 
to "permit" school boards to enter into five year con-
tracts, a fortiori, legislation would have been neces-
sary to allow a board to make a "lifetime and good 
behavior" tenure contract before the 1953 Act. No 
such statute exists. Therefore, any such contract as 
Appellant claims is clearly ultra vires and void. 
It is not contended as Appellant suggests that 
the members of a board of education may not bind 
their successors by employing a teacher for a period 
extending beyond the term of office of the board 
members. Such doctrine based on the historical dis-
tinction between governmental and proprietary ac-
tivities (See Jacobberger v. School District No. 1, 
256 P 652 Ore., 1927) is now generally recognized 
as too great a limitation on the effectiveness of a 
board's operations in view of the staggered terms 
of board members. To meet the needs of an effici-
ently operated school system, the courts have modi-
fied this ancient doctrine to allow contracts for a 
reasonable period of time. (See annotations at 70 
ALR 802 and 149 ALR 343) These cases in up-
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holding contracts determined to be for a reasonable 
time have all dealt with contracts with definite 
terms. The contract Appellant claims has no such 
definite term. She claims a teacher having "profes-
sional tenure" is employed until the age of 65 unless 
removed for cause and after full inquiry and hear-
ing. 
It is submitted that such an indefinite contract 
is not necessary for the operation of the school sys-
tem and is for an unreasonable length of time. In 
fact, the 1953 Act constitutes a legislative fjnding 
that up to five years is what is necessary andreas-
onable . 
. After the effective date of the 1953 Act- that 
is, Februaiy 18, 1954, the board could have made 
a five year contract with Appellant, but the Board, 
instead, on March 29, 1954, chose not to make any 
con tract with Mrs. Rees. 
D. Any contract of the nature contended for by 
Appellant extending beyond the school term was illusory 
for want of mutuality of obligation. 
Appellant's claimed "permanent" contract . 
after a three year probationary period was illusory 
for want of mutuality of obligation. Parenthetically, 
it should be noted that this is the non-Federal issue 
reserved by the Supreme Court in the case cited by ~ 
Appellant. State c.t; rcl. Andc1·son Y. Brand, 303 
u.s. 95. 
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Plaintiff here contends she was bound for one 
year. It is clear that is all the Board was bound. 
At the end of one year the Board elected not to re-
new her contract. This is a far different situation 
than that in the Wyoming case, Tracy v. School 
District No. 22, 243 P 2d 932, cited by Appellant. 
In that case the Board had terminated the teacher's 
employment during the school year, i.e., a discharge. 
There was no obligation on the part of Ap-
pellant to teach beyond the one year term. There 
is nothing expressly or impliedly in the contract 
which bound her to teach beyond that specified time. 
Therefore, as to any obligation of the Board to hire 
her beyond the one year term, "it lacked the essential 
element of mutuality of obligation and was termin-
able at will by either party". Price v. Western Loan 
and Savings Co., 35 Utah 379, 100 P. 677. The same 
rule is stated in 135 ALR 646 that where the em-
ployee furnishes no consideration additional to the 
services incident to his employment, the agreement 
amounts only to an indefinite hiring terminable 
at the will of either party. As pointed out in Corbin 
on Contracts, Section 96, such an agreement termin-
able at the will of either party is not an enforce-
able contract when made. All part performance by 
the employee does is to create a unilateral contract 
binding on the employer to pay the specified wages 
for the actual period of employment. 
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Therefore, quite aside from the power of the 
Board to make the type of contract apparently con-
tended for by Appellant, no enforceable agreement 
was made beyond each year's term. As to the last of 
such annual contracts, both parties have performed 
in full and there is no liability for the Board's deci-
sion not to deal with Appellant further. 
E. No such contract as contended by Appellant 
existed. 
In Point I of her brief, Appellant claims the 
trial court erred in granting summary judgment on 
the grounds she had shown a prima facie case of 
tenure. It is submitted that the evidence which Ap-
pellant claims establishes such prima facie case 
indicates quite the contrary. 
'The contracts of employment themselves offer 
no evidence of tenure. Each contract is only for one 
year. There is nothing about the contract which 
would indicate a continuing relationship beyond one 
school year. Nothing is required of either party be-
yond the one year term prescribed. Each annual 
contract is an integration of the agreement between 
the Board and the teacher. 
Each of the contracts for the first four years 
Appellant was hired (R 6, 7, 8 and 9) contain in 
paragraph 4 thereof a reference to "no discharge 
without a thorough investigation and hearing be-
fore the Board." But the contract for the 1953-54 
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school year (R 10), the last contract under which 
Appellant was hired, has no such provision. The 
paragraph 4 in the last contract provides, instead, 
that the teacher has a right to terminate the con-
tract on ten days written notice. Such a provision 
does not indicate a contemplated lifetime relation-
ship. Again, these paragraphs 4 of the earlier con-
tracts refer only to discharge, and, as we have 
pointed out, Appellant was not discharged. 
Each contract of employment provides in Para-
graph 1 thereof that the teacher agrees to be sub-
ject to the rules and regulations of the Board. The 
only reference to tenure in the rules and regula-
tions of the Murray Board of Education is that the 
"tenure of office of all employees shall be at the 
pleasure of the Board". ( R 19) 
Appellant also relies for her prima facie case 
of tenure on the correspondence and deposition of 
Dr. James Clove, a former Superintendent of Mur-
ray Schools. Appellant refers to the statement in 
the letter of Dr. Clove to all teachers, dated April 
21, 1949, (R 22): "The Board of Education has 
extended the probationary period of new teachers 
from one year to three years to obtain tenure". In 
taking Dr. Glove's deposition, Appellant attempted 
to expand that statement into a contractual rela-
tionship, but Dr. Clove both on direct and cross-
examination made it clear that he was talking not 
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about "legal tenure", but about "professional ten-
ure". (Deposition, pp. 7, 23, 24, and 27.) He also 
made it clear that the employment of a teacher in 
the Murray School District was on a year to year 
basis. (Deposition, p. 31.) Professional tenure in 
the mind of Dr. Clove so far as contract renewal 
was concerned, meant no more than the question of 
renewal of a teacher's contract after the probation-
ary period was a matter for the Board of Educa-
tion. It is merely a policy of indicating to teachers 
that so long as they were doing work satisfactory 
to the Board, they could expect to be rehired. The 
Board still remains the final word on whether or 
not the teacher will be offered a new contract. 
In discussing the relationship of tenure to the 
"Recommended Procedure for Orderly Dismissal of 
'Teachers for Incompetency and Other Causes", pro-
posed by a group of educators in 1947-1948, both 
Dr. Clove, who was Superintendent at the time the 
matter was first presented, and J. Easton Parratt, 
the present Superintendent, are certain that no such 
procedure was ever adopted by the Murray Board 
of Education. (See Dr. Clove's deposition, pp. 25 
and 28, and the deposition of Mr. Parratt, p. 50, 
and the affidavit of J. Easton Parratt. R 18) No 
record of such adoption appears in the Board's min-
utes. On the contrary, the affidavits of Board mem-
bers and the depositions of the two superintendents 
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indicate that the Murray Board has treated each 
case on an ad hoc basis, and that no formal proce-
dure was ever adopted. (See e.g., Clove deposition, 
p. 3, lines 24-30; Parratt deposition, p. 13, line 3) 
In addition, the Manual on Teachers' Security 
prepared by the Utah Education Association in 1952 
shows that the "Orderly Dismissal Procedure" was 
not adopted in the Murray District. (Manual, pp. 
18-20) 
But quite aside from the meaning of tenure 
as used in Dr. Clove's letter or as he believed tenure 
should be, (Clove deposition, p. 28) it is quite clear 
that no tenure policy applied to Appellant as she 
was and is a married woman. The tenure policy, 
whatever it was, was not applicable to Appellant as 
she did not fall within the class of teachers encom-
passed by the policy. 
In February, 1950, the Board of Education 
adopted the fo1lowing resolution: 
"The question of the continued employ-
ment of married women teachers was debated 
by the board. The board agreed unanimously 
that married women after three years pro-
bation teaching, if rehired must agree that 
employment is on a year to year temporary 
basis without attaining tenure." (Exhibit 
"G" to the affidavit of J. Easton Parratt 
R 19) 
The effect of this resolution was reported to 
all teachers by the letter of March 17, 1950 (Exhi-
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bit "C" of the affidavit of Parratt R 24), and was 
incorporated in the contract transmitted by the 
letter of March 19, 1950, covering the 1950-1951 
school year (Exhibit "B", Parratt affidavit R 23), 
and was referred to in item 6 of each contract for 
the ensuing years. It is clear that from this resolu-
tion and the announcement to the teachers that no 
tenure ·was implied in the contract offer which Mrs. 
Rees accepted in 1950 and in subsequent years, as 
she was a married woman. Therefore, plaintiff's 
argument of implied contract arising out of the pro-
fessional tenure policy of the Board falls, as the 
offer was never made to her or to other married 
women. Her married status was not the reason for 
the Board's refusal to rehire her, but that is im-
material. The point is that the tenure policy had no 
application to persons in her class. 
II. APPELLANT HAS NO RIGHT TO A HEAR-
ING. 
Appellant further complains at pages 26-28 of 
her brief that the Board of Education did not give 
her the hearing to which she claims she was entitled. 
As support for her contention Appellant cites cases 
from states which have tenure and dismissal pro-
cedure by statute. ,Of course, since Utah has no such 
statute, these cases are inapplicable. In making her 
contention, Appellant also overlooks these facts: 
( 1) She was not di.scharged. All the Board of 
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Education did was to decide not to renew her con-
tract and so advised her. 
( 2) The provision referring to investigation 
and hearing in case of discharge contained in the 
contracts of employment had been eliminated in the 
contract in effect for the 1953-1954 school year. 
That is the contract which was in effect at the time 
and which governs the rights and obligations of the 
parties. 
(3) The Board granted Appellant an oppor-
tunity to be heard. (R 41) IIer counsel notified the 
Board (R 63) that he had advised her not to attend 
the special hearing called at her request. (R 41) By 
refusing to attend such hearing, she waived any 
rights to a hearing if any she had. 
Since it is clear Appellant was not entitled to 
a hearing under her written con tract, she claims 
on Page 27 of her Brief that the Board is estopped 
to deny the effect of Dr. Clove's letter of April, 1949, 
or that the Board ratified such letter. In the first 
place as we have shown, the Clove letter on "profes-
sional tenure" did not apply to married teachers 
such as Appellant. In the second place the Board 
cannot be estopped or be found to have ratified a 
contract beyond its authority. In the third place the 
facts show that the proposed "Dismissal Procedure" 
was never taken up before the Board. (Clove deposi-
tion, pp. 25-28; Parratt affidavit, R 18 and 19) 
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or that any hearing procedure was ever adopted 
by the Murray Board of Education. (Parry Mfi-
davit, R 4'2-43; Day Affidavit, R 44-45) The record 
shows that in the handling of the discharge of 
teachers in Murray, each case was on an ad hoc 
basis. (Clove deposition, p. 16; Parry and Day M-
fidavits, R 42, 43, 44 and 45.) There can be no rati-
fication of a procedure never considered by the 
Board or applied by it in practice. 
III. THE COURT BELOW DID NOT ERR IN DIS-
MISSING THE SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION AS TO 
THE BOARD OF EDUCATION AND ITS INDIVIDUAL 
MEMBERS. 
As stated by Appellant at page 31 of her brief, 
the gist of her claim in her second cause of action 
is interference with contractual relations as out-
lined in Section 766 of the Restatement of Torts. 
That section describes as a tort the inducement of a 
third person either (a) not to perform a contract 
with another, or (b) not to enter into or continue 
a business relationship with another. 
As has already been shown Appellant's only 
contract with the Board was to serve for the school 
term 1953-1954. This contract was fully performed 
by both parties. Therefore, Sub-section (a) of Sec-
tion 766 is not applicable. 
As stated, 766 refers to inducing a third person. 
In this case all the Board did was to advise Mrs. 
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· Rees that it had decided not to enter into a contract 
with her for the succeeding school year. The Board 
members themselves are the ones charged by law 
with the responsibility of making such determina-
tion. The corporate entity of the Board could act 
only through its members. It is difficult to see how 
those members making a determination in their of-
ficial capacity could be liable in their individual 
capacities for so determining, or inducing them-
selves to so determine. It is even more difficult to 
see how the school board, as a corporate entity which 
had no obligation to contract, could be liable for 
not entering in to a con tract. No third person was or 
could have been induced by the Board or its mem-
bers, who were the very ones to do the contracting. 
This is made clear by the court's refusal to dis-
miss as to the superintendent of schools and the 
principal of the high school. Neither of these indi-
viduals were to contract with Mrs. Rees. Therefore, 
if they, without privilege to do so, induced the Board 
and its members not to enter into a new contract 
for the 1954-1955 school year with Mrs. Rees, Sec-
tion 766 of the Restatement might apply to them, 
but certainly not to the Board or its members. The 
individual members of the Board with respect to the 
decision not to re-employ Mrs. Rees could act only 
in their official capacity as members of the Board 
and not as individuals. To hold otherwise, would 
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tend to hinder elected board members from acting 
on their judgment for the interest of the Board of 
Education for fear of possible personal liability. 
Members of a board of education are performing 
a public service for an honorarium of $100.00 per 
year. (Section 53-6-8, U.C.A., 1953) If they could 
be held liable for their acts as Board members exer-
cising their collective judgment as a Board whether 
or not to re-employ a given teacher, the inducement 
to enter such public service would be negated. To 
impose liability in situations of this sort is against 
public policy. 
Furthermore, Appellant claims that all the 
Board members conspired with each other to have 
the Board not re-employ Mrs. Rees. The claim as to 
"all" shows the absurdity of the situation. Even if 
one member or a conspiracy of a minority, by false 
representations, knowingly made to induce a major-
ity to refuse to contract might incur liability for 
wrongfully so inducing the majority, how could all, 
who must make a decision, be liable for such deCi-
sion. Such a policy would substitute the judgment 
of the court for the judgment of the Board as to 
whether or not to make a particular contract. Such 
is not the law in this State. Beard v. Board of Edu-
cation, 81 Utah 51, 16 P 2d 900; Allen v. Board of 
Education, 120 Utah 556, 236 P 2d 756. 
One other point should be made with respect 
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to the second cause of action. It sounds in tort and 
Appellant so characterizes it in her brief. Yet it is 
well settled in this jurisdiction that a board of edu-
cation is an instrun1entality of the state in the per-
formance of a governmental function and conse-
quently such board partakes of the State's sov-
ereign immunity with respect to tort liability. Bing-
ham v. Board of Education of Ogden City, 118 Utah 
582, 223 P 2d 432; Woodcock v. Board of Educa-
tion, 55 Utah 458, 187 P 181. As the Board mem-
bers, in determining whether or not to employ Mrs. 
Rees, are acting in the scope of their authority for 
a governmental purpose such immunity from tort 
liability applies both to the Board of Education as 
a corporate entity and to its individua1 members. 
See the annotation at 160 ALR 7, 32; 47 Am. Jur., 
Schools, § 60; Consolidated School District No. 1 
v. Wright, 261 P. 953, (Okla., 1927). 
CONCLUSION 
The protection of the professional relationship 
and employment security of teachers for which Ap-
pellant so eloquently argues can be acheived without 
the necessity of contractual tenure. Murray, like 
other school districts, had and continues to have a 
policy of renewing the annual con tracts of teachers 
without regard to their politics, religion, nepotic re-
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lationship or the availability of younger teachers 
at a lower salary. (Parry Affidavit, R 42; Day 
Affidavit, R 44; Parratt Affidavit, R 18; Clove 
Deposition, pp. 27-28) Such a policy is not a con-
tractual obligation of indefinite duration, but is a 
policy to be applied in the discretion of the board 
in light of its duties and responsibilities. It is the 
position of the board here that it properly exercised 
its discretion and its policy in making its decision 
with respect to Mrs. Rees. It is further the position 
of the Board that whether its judgment was correct 
is not a question for which it is required to answer 
in court. 
Whether Mrs. Rees was or was not a good 
teacher, whether or not the board was arbitrary in 
dealing with her, whether or not the Board's judg-
ment was correct that her "outside activities and 
general attitude were unduly interferring with her 
duties as a teacher" are not the issues here. The 
sole issue is whether there was a binding contract 
between the Board of Education and Mrs. Rees, en-
titling her to re-employment for the school year 
1954-1955 and for succeeding years until she reach-
ed the age of 65. 
It is submitted that on the law and undisputed 
facts in this case no such binding contract existed. 
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the 
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lower court was correct and its judgment should be 
affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
PETER W. BILLINGS 
Attorney for Respondents 
31 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
